Some advocates and supporters of social impact bonds appear to have shifted their position on the importance of cashable savings. My colleague (Eileen Robinson) attended a seminar a few weeks ago where a spokesperson from Social Finance argue strongly that SIBs did not need to be underpinned by cashable savings. Now an interesting piece by Adrian Brown has argued that a strong focus on cashable savings is holding back the development of SIBs and the social investment market generally. He argues that SIBs should be mainly about innovation, not about financial returns.
Simply put, the case for identifying cashable savings is that they enable SIBs to be self funding – effectively an extension of the invest to save principle. This was always one of the main attractions of the SIB approach, especially for a government looking for solutions to unprecedented financial pressure on public services. The case against – eloquently put by Adrian Brown – is that an over-emphasis on the cashability of savings may restrict both the outcomes that might be funded through a SIB, and the total funding made available. In essence, commissioners may look for projects simply because they enable savings to be cashed, rather than because they achieve the most important outcomes, or enable them to test new ways of doing things.
I have no problem with the argument that we should not obsess about cashable savings, or that we should focus mainly on the value of the outcomes to be achieved. However, I am concerned that we risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater if we start to argue that cashable savings are not important. Here are three reasons why I think they should remain at the centre of thinking.
First, while some commissioners may want to use SIBs solely to test innovation, most cannot afford to do this. Their main motivation is to find ways to fund outcomes that would otherwise not be funded – and usually to fund preventative or early intervention which reduces the need for (more expensive) crisis intervention. Not all the savings achieved will be cashable, but some will be, and often enough will be cashable to make the whole project viable.
Second, there are some outcomes which are socially worthwhile and do achieve early, cashable payback. This is particularly the case when dealing with an existing issue which imposes high costs, such as children in residential care, and vulnerable adults with high care needs. If interventions can be commissioned which enable such groups to live in the community, there are likely to be improved outcomes for them as individuals AND cashable savings to pay for the services. In these cases, what’s not to like?
The final argument is about the rigour that a SIB or PbR process imposes on commissioners. Adrian Brown suggests that instead of trying to match outcomes to savings, commissioners should “regularly look across the portfolio of services they buy and ask themselves which are the least effective. Decommissioning these services frees up current spending that can be used to fund SIBs in policy areas where innovation is most urgently needed”.
But we see little evidence that commissioners have either the data available, or review processes in place, to enable them to do this rationally. In our experience of working with commissioners over the last three years, a key benefit of the SIB development process is that it allows the commissioner to consider in detail what it costs to provide a service, what is the impact of that service – in both financial and non-financial terms – and whether an alternative service will achieve better returns – both social and financial. And if their financial analysis shows that they can improve outcomes to the point where they can decommission a service to achieve cashable savings, that is surely better than making less well informed and perhaps arbitrary decisions about what services should no longer be funded.
So if commissioners want to see SIBs as a way to test innovation and have the funding to use them in that way, fine by me,. If they want to use them to save money and introduce much greater rigour into their commissioning processes, why not?